Rewatch notes: Atlanta United vs. New England Revolution, March 9, 2024

A tiny soccer brain keeps chugging along

via Atlanta United

After every match, we’re going to do our best to dig into the tactics and personnel that defined the weekend’s action. It’s tough to notice those things when you’re stressed out during the actual game, so we like to take a couple of days to rewatch, take notes and try and understand the part of the game that’s not played on a spreadsheet a little better. It’s not what you’d call an exact science, but at least we’re trying. 

Atlanta United pummeled New England on Saturday night. Just rolled over them. And, in doing so, they gave us a handful of textbook(ish) examples of what this team wants to do tactically. 

A common criticism around Atlanta United internet is that this team hasn’t had a tactical identity under Gonzalo Pineda. It annoys me. In fact, it’s so annoying, I took this whole 2,100 word thing out from behind the paywall so I could hear about it just a little bit less. (It’s the last time though don’t get used to it free subscribers.)

If you were paying attention on Saturday, you saw Atlanta executing on the tactical principles that have been established in Atlanta for a while. The biggest difference now is that Atlanta has above-average or better MLS players at every outfield position. Garth Lagerwey has said in multiple places (including this very website) that the club “owed Gonzalo a team.” He has one now. 

Now, to be fair, it took a while for that team to start executing at a high level in their second game of the year, but eventually they got comfortable and overwhelmed an increasingly exhausted New England side. 

Here’s how they did it. 

(If you’ve been following FSF or my coverage of the team for the last few years, you’re probably aware of a lot of these principles already. But every comic book is somebody's first issue, right?) 

By building out of the back with a line of three and overloading the left to switch to the right

You might immediately be saying “Oh god, we’re going to talk about the building with three at the back thing again???” Well, get used to it. Atlanta’s successful execution of this concept game over game is going to determine how this season goes. 

A common thought among managers whose game models are predicated on possession and being on the front foot—Gonzalo Pineda and Wilfried Nancy have both spoken on this—is that they don’t have to focus week-to-week on going back to the drawing board tactically. Yeah, there are tweaks here and there, but the main focus is on being the best you that you can be. 

Our buddy Tiotal Football is absolutely going to write about this better than me soon, but I’m going to give a bit of a teaser. Think about American football coaches like the late Mike Leach or Paul Johnson. Leach ran an air raid offense that essentially has roughly 10 different standard passing plays that the team runs over and over. Johnson ran a triple-option offense that has roughly 10 different standard option plays that the team runs over and over. The defense knows what’s coming. But both Leach and Johnson put together incredibly successful scoring teams anyway. 

Obviously, there’s infinitely more variation moment to moment in soccer.  But the concept is the same. We’re going to see Atlanta United attempt to execute on the same principles, even when the other team knows it’s coming, because they believe that it won’t be stopped as long as they execute effectively. So, let’s review what they’re trying to execute effectively. 

The basic concept here is that Atlanta United will attempt to progress the ball from their own third with three at the back. That three is formed with either a goalkeeper, a fullback or a No. 6 joining the center backs. In most cases against New England, Atlanta built with Caleb Wiley joining the back three. By having three players at the back, Atlanta should, in theory, have the numbers to maintain possession without worrying too much about being overwhelmed. 

That back three’s job is to break the first line of the opponent’s defense so Atlanta can progress the ball down the left. They’re going to make that job a little easier by overloading the left side and attempting to create a numbers advantage. If Atlanta can’t work directly through the left side, they can switch play to right side where Saba Lobjanidze and Brooks Lennon are waiting in space to take on defenders one-v-one. This is where Thiago Almada’s on-ball ability and understanding of how to operate in the left half-space becomes critical. Here’s what that positioning can look like…

And here’s what it looks like in motion as Almada drops into space to receive the ball…

And a different variation…

This is the basic setup. But there are choices players can make that add wrinkles within that setup. The double pivot of Bartosz Slisz and Tristan Muyumba can choose to get forward when the opportunity presents itself. Brooks Lennon can choose to join the midfield or stay wide. And Almada can interpret space as needed. To name a few. 

In this game, New England’s midfield did their best to keep close tabs on Almada. He tended to find success by dropping deeper to receive the ball or by shifting into the right half-space. 33% of Atlanta’s entries into the final third came down the left wing. 19% came via the left half space. 16% down the right wing. And 33% via the right half-space.

That’s not necessarily typical, but Atlanta took what got offered to them here to great effect. It helped, of course, that New England offered them a lot. The bottom line is that Atlanta has too much attacking talent to try and outlast them. If you’re not going to press effectively like Columbus did, you’re going to be in trouble. New England didn’t press and Atlanta carved them up.  Then again, you might be in trouble anyway if Atlanta is going to do everything this perfectly.

Yes, I know, this is the buildup from a goal kick I complained about all last week. Credit where it’s due, they were as good as it gets here. Especially Derrick Williams. 

Rest defense or “Active Defending”

Overally, any problems in attack in the first half didn’t come from tactical issues, but from simple lack of execution. Those issues affected the defense as well. Bad giveaways led to transition opportunities for New England that nearly turned the game on its head. 

But it’s not just giving the ball away that caused issues. Yeah, those giveaways were bad and very “second game of the season for an MLS team on new turf”, but the supermajority of possessions in this sport end with the ball going to the opponent. Giveaways are a given. What became a problem for Atlanta United early on is that they weren’t positioned to respond to those giveaways. 

The two players who change their position vertically in a game are the fullbacks. In general, Brooks Lennon will be tasked with getting forward more often than Caleb Wiley, but Wiley will still make overlapping runs when the opportunity presents itself. With that freedom comes responsibility. Both fullbacks need to be aware of the other at all times. Otherwise, this can happen. 

You can see Lennon recognize that he’s in the wrong position here and begin to retreat. Wiley is already forward. Unfortunately, that moment of recognition is when a poorly placed pass comes in. Do we see the problem here?

“The other thing is, I'm very happy that most of the time that when Caleb goes, Brooks was staying,” Gonzalo Pineda said after the game. “There was only one play where both went higher and we took a massive counterattack. I was very upset. And then after that I think they were much better the understanding between fullbacks and winger was really good particularly.”

Taking risks is fine from time to time. But Atlanta has to maintain structural integrity as well. Making sure they’re in proper position while in possession so that transition moments can be handled effectively is something Atlanta have been working on for a while now. They call it “Active Defending” you probably call it “Rest Defense” if you’ve called it anything before.  

Mistakes will happen though. It helps in these times to have center backs and midfielders who can cover ground at speed. Atlanta has those for the first time in a while. And, so far, they’ve been able to scramble and reorganize in transition successfully. That’s a great sign. 

“Pressing to attack” out of a 4-4-2 mid-block

Those transition opportunities did lead to New England’s best chances in this one. But Atlanta still had imperfect moments in more organized defensive states. 

You’ve probably noticed by now that Atlanta has elected to setup shop in midfield with two banks of four and GG and Almada up top when their opponent is in possession. It looks like this.

Atlanta does their best to keep this shape and stay compact as opponents shift the ball side to side, and will press out of this shape when the opponent activates certain pressing triggers. Something like a backpass, a heavy touch, or a pass that sends a fullback back and toward the touchline. At that point, Atlanta’s primary objective is to force their opponent down one side of the field and to keep them from working back into the middle where they have more numbers and more space to operate. GG in particular executes well in this regard by taking horizontal angels to the player in possession and preventing him from working back inward.

However, when it doesn’t quite work…

But when it does work! 

Gonzalo Pineda said at training on Tuesday that Atlanta needed to be more effective overall at applying proper pressure. (They call it “pressing to attack.”) There were moments against both New England and Columbus where opponents were able to cut through Atlanta’s press. 

That being said, he also acknowledged that the team has typically been very solid in their organized 4-4-2 setup. I’d definitely agree. And that’s part of why you shouldn’t really expect this team to be an ultra-high pressing, heavy-metal football kind of team defensively. The press can definitely be improved and play a key role in Atlanta’s success defending, but it won’t be the primary objective. Pressing when appropriate, effective rest defense and reorganization to limit transition opportunities, and an organized and compact 4-4-2 mid-block will all work in concert.

New England did their damndest to find holes in that mid-block in the first half. 

Take a look at New England left back DeJuan Jones here on the near side. I know everyone got focused on Carles Gil coming in from the right side, but that’s not what caused issues for Atlanta defensively. In addition to having an extra midfielder to try and limit Almada, New England’s 4-3-3 base formation shifted into what’s basically a 3-4-1-2 in possession that exploited the space between Saba Lobjanidze and Brooks Lennon. Jones found space over and over again. The picture above is one of many.  In fact, 46% of New England’s attacking entries into the final third came down that left wing. 

The good news for Atlanta though is that they adjusted. Not in any real tactical sense. They stayed in that compact 4-4-2 mid-block. But Lobjanidze improved his spacing as the game went on and both he and Lennon began to react at speed any time the Revs began to push the ball that way. Nothing all that threatening came down that left side. It helps to have a player as physically capable as Gregersen helping out behind you.

Attacking in transition at speed

The last key principle will talk about is an obvious one. When Atlanta gets the ball in space, they want to attack at speed. That hasn’t always been a given for Atlanta teams the last few years. On Saturday, they were more than up for it. Having the proper personnel to do it makes a big difference. Just saying, when you see this particular group of five (the attacking front + Lennon) running at you at pace, you’re in trouble. 

Anyway, it helps when Giorgos Giakoumakis is effective as a springboard for Atlanta to play off of in these moments. He struggles at times with the ball at his feet, but he did have a couple of touches coming back to the ball that kickstarted major opportunities.

In conclusion

If you see a friend say, “This team just doesn’t have a tactical identity”, I would really like them to stop that please and thanks.